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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RECESS IS OVER: NARROWING THE PRESIDENTIAL RECESS
APPOINTMENT POWER IN NLRB V. NOEL CANNING

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the
1
End of their next Session.

INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Recess Appointments Clause2 (the Clause) has engendered
substantial controversy in the legal and political world. In the case of NLRB v.
Noel Canning,3 the Clause was the center of one of the United States Supreme
Court’s most high profile cases in its October 2013 term. The case was of great
interest to many, not only because it presented a matter of first impression to
the Court on a constitutional issue, but also because it pitted a small company
against the Executive Branch in a battle over presidential power.
In Noel Canning, the Supreme Court held that certain recess appointments
made by President Barack Obama in 2011 were invalid because the President
had overstepped the power given to him under the Clause. In so doing, the
Court upheld the judgments of most United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
that had ruled on the issue. However, while the circuit courts took a narrow
view of the President’s power to make recess appointments, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Clause “practically” and took a broader view. The Court issued
three holdings. First, “the Recess,” as used in the Clause, referred to Senate
breaks occurring within single sessions of the Senate known as “intrasession”
recesses, as well as to breaks occurring between two formal Senate sessions,
known as “intersession” recesses. The Court held that in order to trigger the
recess appointment power, however, the Senate break must be greater than ten
days. Second, the Court held that “vacancies that may happen” included not
only vacancies arising during a recess, but also vacancies arising while the
Senate was still in session and continuing to exist into the recess. Third, the
Court held that pro forma Senate sessions qualified as actual sessions of the
Senate sufficient to prevent the chamber from going into a recess.
This Note analyzes only the issue raised in the Court’s first holding—the
meaning of the term “the Recess” as used in the Recess Appointments

1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
2. Id.
3. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
1167
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Clause—and argues that the term should only be interpreted to apply to
intersession recesses. Since the recess appointments at issue were made during
intrasession recesses, if the Court had held that the term “the Recess” refers to
intersession recesses, it would not have had to decide the other two issues.
Part I of the Note provides the background facts of the case. Part II sets
forth the relevant precedent in the United States Circuit Courts and then
discusses the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Noel Canning as well
as Justice Scalia’s concurrence. Finally, Part III provides an analysis of the
Clause’s text and structure, and argues why the “practical” interpretation set
down by the Court is inferior to the intersession interpretation.
I. BACKGROUND
Noel Canning’s tale begins with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or the Board). The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) states that
the NLRB is to be comprised of five members, of whom three “constitute a
quorum,” appointed by the President with the “advice and consent of the
Senate.”4 In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act required a quorum in
order for the Board to issue binding rulings.5
On December 17, 2011, the United States Senate had agreed by unanimous
consent to conduct only short pro forma sessions every three days, with “no
business” being conducted.6 On January 3, 2012—a day the Senate held a pro
forma session—due to the expiration of a previous recess appointment, the
Board had only two members.7 The next day, on January 4, President Obama
purported to exercise his recess appointment power and argued that the Senate
was in recess.8 In claiming the right to exercise this constitutional appointment
power, the President appointed Sharon Block, Terence F. Flynn, and Richard
Griffin to the three vacant spots on the Board.9
In February, after the President’s appointments, the Board, with its newly
appointed members, issued a ruling against a bottling company named Noel

4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(a)–(b) (2012).
5. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010).
6. DAVID H. CARPENTER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42323, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S
JANUARY 4, 2012, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2012).
7. Id. at 1–2; Joint Brief for Petitioner Noel Canning and Movant-Intervenors Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America and the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace at 7,
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1115) [hereinafter Joint Brief].
8. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 11–12.
9. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to
Key Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012) [hereinafter White House Recess Appointments
Announcement], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of fice/2012/01/04/presidentobama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts.
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Canning.10 The company then petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review.11 Citing
the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in New Process Steel,12 Noel Canning argued
the Board lacked a quorum due to the fact that the three “recess” appointments
were invalid because the Senate was never actually in recess when the
President made the appointments,13 and, accordingly, the Board’s ruling itself
was invalid.14
II. PRECEDENT AND THE NOEL CANNING OPINION
A.

Precedent

Until recently, courts had provided very little judicial precedent involving
the Recess Appointments Clause. The issue was a matter of first impression for
the Supreme Court,15 and prior to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Noel Canning,
only a few cases involving the Clause had come before the United States
Courts of Appeal.16 Of the three prior appellate cases, only one decided what
constitutes a “recess.” In United States v. Allocco, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a challenge by a criminal defendant to
the authority of a district court judge who had been appointed during a Senate
recess.17 In rejecting the challenge, the appeals court held that the Recess
Appointments Clause gave the President the power to recess appoint federal
judges and to fill vacancies that actually arose while the Senate was in session
but continued to exist during a recess.18 Twenty-two years later in United
States v. Woodley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
also upheld the President’s power to recess appoint “judicial officers.”19

10. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 13. The company was involved in a labor dispute with a
local labor union. Id.
11. Id. at 14.
12. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010).
13. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 15–16.
14. Id. at 16.
15. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
16. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel on the Lawfulness of Recess
Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36
Op. O.L.C. 8 (2012) [hereinafter OLC Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/opinions/2012/01/31/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf. At least two lower courts have
taken up the issue, however, and ruled that the President could make intrasession recess
appointments. Id.
17. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 705–06 (2d Cir. 1962).
18. Id. at 709–10, 712.
19. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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In the third case, Evans v. Stephens, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that “recess” extended to intrasession recesses.20 In
Evans, the petitioner claimed that a judge appointed to the Eleventh Circuit
lacked the authority to sit on the panel because he had been appointed by
President George W. Bush during an intrasession recess.21 The petitioner
argued, inter alia, that an intrasession recess does not qualify as a recess under
the Clause.22 The court, however, found that an intrasession break fit the
eighteenth century dictionary definition of “recess” and that “the text of the
Constitution does not differentiate expressly between inter-and intrasession
recesses for [the Clause].”23 It discounted the argument that the use of the word
“the” in the phrase “the Recess” utilized in the Clause indicated that the Clause
references a single recess at the end of the Senate’s session and found that the
phrase could refer “to any one . . . of the Senate’s acts of recessing,” whether
intrasession or intersession.24 The court also rejected the argument that the use
of the word “adjournment” in three other clauses of the Constitution limits the
use of “recess” to only an intersession break.25 Rather than “describing a block
of time,” the court found that “adjournment” could describe the action of
Congress taking a break.26 Finally, the court looked to traditional presidential
practice and noted that presidents had made recess appointments during shorter
intrasession breaks.27 The court ultimately held that “given the words of the
Constitution and the history,” it was not persuaded “by the argument that the
recess appointment power may only be used in an intersession . . . but not an
intrasession recess.”28
In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit then issued its opinion in Noel Canning and held that the Clause
referred only to intersession recesses. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit issued a

20. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004). There were two dissents;
however, neither one addressed the intersession versus intrasession issue. Id. at 1228 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1238 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 1221–22 (majority opinion).
22. Id. at 1224.
23. Id. The court cited to a 1755 dictionary that defined “recess” “as ‘retirement; retreat;
withdrawing; secession’ or ‘remission and suspension of any procedure.’” Id.
24. Id. at 1224–25.
25. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1225.
26. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the fact that in Wright v. United States, 302 U.S.
583 (1938), the Supreme Court suggested that “adjournment” signified a period over which a
break is taken. The Eleventh Circuit found that even if applying this usage, “adjournment” would
describe only an intersession break, while a “recess” could occur intrasession. Id.
27. Id. at 1225. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that in the past, “[t]welve Presidents have
made more than 285 intrasession recess appointments.” Id. at 1226.
28. Id.
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very broad ruling.29 In fact, in siding with Noel Canning, the court’s ruling
went even further than the company had requested. While Noel Canning had
requested the court to hold that intrasession breaks lasting less than three days
did not constitute a “recess,” the court ruled that no intrasession breaks
whatsoever constituted a “recess” under the Clause.30 Therefore, the court held
that the appointments at issue were improper, thereby invalidating the ruling
against Noel Canning because the Board lacked a quorum.31 In ruling that only
intersession recess appointments were constitutional, the court was able to
avoid the task of having to decide whether a pro forma session constituted an
actual Senate session.
In its ruling, the D.C. Circuit placed heavy reliance on the fact that the
Framers used the definite article “the” in “the Recess”32 and claimed that its
usage suggested the intersession interpretation.33 The court also argued that the
intrasession interpretation did not fit with the structure and purpose of the
Recess Appointments Clause.34 In its structural analysis, the D.C. Circuit
pointed to an analysis of the Clause by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist
67, which noted that a recess appointment is the “auxiliary method” of
executive appointments.35 After discussing that analysis, the court argued that
it does not make sense to extend the “auxiliary” method of appointment to an
intrasession break.36 If it were so extended, argued the court, then the
“auxiliary” recess appointment method could “swallow the ‘general’ route of
advice and consent.”37
Finally, the D.C. Circuit also discounted the presidential practice of
intrasession recess appointments.38 It noted the lack of intrasession recess
appointments in the first 150 years of the Republic and also refused to give
weight to recent presidential practices. The court argued that such an absence
of intrasession appointments in the Republic’s early years “‘suggests an
assumed absence of [the] power’ to make such appointments.”39

29. John Elwood, DC Circuit Strikes Down President Obama’s Recess Appointments,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/25/dc-circuit
-strikes-down-president-obamas-recess-appointments/.
30. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 29; Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 499, 506 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).
31. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506–07.
32. Id. at 500.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 501.
35. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502–03.
36. Id. at 503.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 502.
39. Id.
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After holding that the Clause applies only to intersession recesses, the D.C.
Circuit also held that the recess appointment power applies only to vacancies
that actually come into existence during an intersession recess.40 However, as
Judge Griffith noted in his concurrence, the court did not need to decide this
second matter since the first issue was dispositive.41
A few months after the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Noel Canning, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued its own ruling on the
Recess Appointments Clause in NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and
Rehabilitation.42 Like the D.C. Circuit, in New Vista, the Third Circuit held
that “the Recess” referred only to intersession breaks.43 In New Vista, the
Obama Administration (the Administration) argued heavily for a standard
advocated by Attorney General Harry Daugherty for determining when the
Senate is unavailable, and therefore, when the President may exercise his
recess appointment power.44 The Administration argued that the standard
allowed appointments during short intrasession breaks.45 However, the court
was unpersuaded that Daugherty’s standard was the proper one to use. The
court found that an examination of Founding Era state constitutions with
similar clauses suggested that the United States Constitution’s Recess
Appointments Clause applied to only either intersession or long intrasession
breaks.46 Additionally, the court reached the same conclusion when it looked to
the context of the Recess Appointments Clause within the scheme of the
separation of powers.47 The court found that using the Daugherty standard to
determine when the Senate was in recess would “eviscerate the divided-powers
framework the two Appointments Clauses establish.”48
After discarding the Daugherty standard, the Third Circuit then set its
sights on determining whether “the Recess” referred to only intersession
breaks, or whether it included long intrasession breaks. The court found that
two aspects of the Clause demonstrated that it referred only to intersession
breaks. First, the court noted that there was no link between “the Recess” and a
40. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 503, 506.
41. Id. at 515 (Griffith, J., concurring) (“The majority acknowledges that our holding on
intrasession recess appointments is sufficient to vacate the Board’s order . . . and I would stop our
constitutional analysis there.”).
42. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2013).
43. Id. at 208.
44. Under Attorney General Daugherty’s standard, the Senate is in recess when it adjourns
such that (1) Senators “owe no duty of attendance”; (2) the chamber is empty; and (3) the Senate
cannot “receive communications from the President or participate as a body in making
appointments.” Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 29, Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705
F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1153).
45. New Vista, 719 F.3d at 220.
46. Id. at 226.
47. Id. at 242.
48. Id. at 230.
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particular length of time.49 The court rejected any link with the Adjournment
Clause50—which requires either chamber of Congress to get the other’s
consent before adjourning for more than three days—and noted that there was
“no constitutional basis for any sort of durational limit on what constitutes ‘the
Recess.’”51 Second, the Third Circuit found the Clause’s provision requiring
that recess-appointed officers’ terms expire at the end of the next Senate
session suggested that the Clause applied to only intersession recesses. It noted
that there was common agreement that a Senate “session” begins with the first
convening of the Senate and ends when the Senate adjourns sine dine or when
its term automatically expires on January 3 of any year. 52 The court found that
the Clause’s requirement that recess-appointed officers’ terms expire at the end
of the next Senate session suggested that their appointments were understood
to be made between separate Senate sessions.53
Finally, in holding that “the Recess” refers only to intersession breaks, the
Third Circuit discarded the Administration’s arguments regarding historical
executive practice. The court found that for the first 100 years after the
framing, “recess” was generally understood to mean only intersession breaks.54
In examining the historical practice of presidents, it found that the use of the
recess appointment power during intrasession breaks was a relatively recent
development, and that such a use of the power was in the sole interest of the
President.55 The court found that such a recent practice was not worthy of
deference by the Judiciary.56
The last United States Circuit Court of Appeal to decide the meaning of
“the Recess” before the United States Supreme Court took up the issue, was
the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Enterprise Leasing Co. Southeast.57 Here, again,
the Administration argued for an “open for business” standard of determining
when the Senate is in recess,58 but like the circuit courts deciding Noel
Canning and New Vista, the Enterprise Leasing court held that the President
was limited to making recess appointments only during intersession recesses.59
The Fourth Circuit placed importance on the fact that the Framers used the
word “recess” in the Clause rather than “adjourn” or “adjournment.”60 The

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 233.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
New Vista, 719 F.3d at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.
New Vista, 719 F.3d at 240–41.
NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 612–13 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 654.
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court found that each time the term “adjourn” or “adjournment” appears in the
Constitution, it refers to an intrasession break.61 The court placed significance
on the use of “recess” solely in the Recess Appointments, when the Framers
could have used “adjourn” and found that this suggested that “the Recess”
referred to intersession breaks.62
The court also examined the context of the Clause within the time of the
Framing. It noted the length of Congressional breaks during the time of the
Constitution’s ratification was around six to nine months, wherein which time
the Senate would be unable to perform its advice and consent function.63 The
court found that this context indicated that the Clause referred to long breaks,
and not short or weekend breaks, which would arguably be covered by the
Administration’s standard.64
In addition to finding that the historical record of presidential practice does
not indicate an “intrasession meaning,” the Fourth Circuit found that the
Administration’s standard offered little guidance to the President in
determining when the Senate was in recess.65 The court indicated that the
separation of powers demands clarity in determining when the Senate is in
recess, and that drawing a line between intersession and intrasession breaks
better provides such clarity than the “unavailable-for-business” standard.66
B.

The United States Supreme Court’s Opinion in Noel Canning

Of the last three circuit court cases pertaining to the Recess Appointments
Clause, Noel Canning was the first one appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. When the Court issued its opinion in June 2014, it upheld the Noel
Canning, New Vista, and Enterprise Leasing courts’ judgments that the
President’s January 2011 recess appointments were invalid, but it provided a
vastly different rationale.
While the Court’s judgment was unanimous, only five justices joined
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.67 Justice Scalia issued an opinion concurring
in the judgment that Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito
joined.68

61. Id. at 642.
62. Enter. Leasing, 722 F.3d at 648.
63. Id. at 649.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 650.
66. Id. at 651.
67. Jonathan H. Adler, All Nine Justices Reject Recess Appointments in Noel Canning Case,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/20
14/06/26/another-unanimous-opinion/.
68. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

RECESS IS OVER

1175

Justice Breyer began the majority opinion by stating that the Court
considered three questions regarding the Recess Appointments Clause.69 The
first was whether the Clause applied to solely intersession recesses or whether
it included intrasession recesses as well.70 Breaking from the recent opinions of
the courts of appeal, Breyer held that the Clause applies to both types of
recesses.71 Second, the Court considered whether the words “vacancies that
may happen” as found in the Clause refer solely to vacancies that come into
existence during a recess, or whether vacancies occurring prior to a recess but
still existing during the recess also qualify.72 The Court held that the Clause
referred to both types.73 Finally, the Court had to determine how long a Senate
recess must occur before the President may exercise his recess appointment
power.74 In deciding this matter, the Court had to determine whether pro forma
sessions qualify as actual sessions of the Senate, sufficient to keep the Senate
from going into recess.75 Breyer and the majority held that such sessions do
qualify as real sessions, and, therefore, the Senate was in the midst of a threeday recess when President Obama made the appointments at issue.76 The
majority held that three days was too short a time for the President to exercise
his recess appointment power.77 Since the focus of this Note is on the meaning
of the word “recess,” the summary of the Court’s opinion and Justice Scalia’s
concurrence will focus mainly on that aspect of the respective opinions.
Justice Breyer began the majority’s analysis by noting the Recess
Appointments Clause’s role as a secondary method of appointment to the
“norm” of the general appointments method; however, he also noted the
“tension” between the President’s need for “the assistance of subordinates”
with the Senate’s practice, in its early years, of meeting for a single brief
session each year.78 With this framework established, interestingly, the Court
indicated that it sought to “interpret the Clause as granting the President the
power to make appointments during a recess but not offering the President the
authority routinely to avoid the need for Senate confirmation.”79
Justice Breyer began the Court’s analysis of the text by looking to
founding era dictionary definitions of “recess,” which he found to include both

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 2556 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2556.
Id.
Id. at 2557.
Id.
Id.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2559.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1176

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1167

intersession and intrasession breaks.80 Additionally, by pointing to other areas
of the Constitution using the definite article “the,” Breyer also discounted the
notion that the Recess Appointments Clause’s use of “the” suggests it applies
only to intersession recesses.81 Therefore, Justice Breyer found the Clause’s
text ambiguous and then turned to executive practice where the Court placed
“significant weight.”82 In fact, the Court used historical practice as its primary
means of support in its ruling, and in doing so, noted its hesitation in upsetting
the “working arrangements” that the Legislative and Executive branches had
reached in regards to recess appointments.83
In examining historical practice, the Court discounted the early lack of
intrasession recess appointments, noting that the lack of intrasession breaks
themselves would prevent intrasession appointments.84 It looked to nineteenth
century opinions issued by United States attorneys general and other executive
advisors and asserted that the available opinions of presidential legal advisors
are essentially unanimous in taking the position that the Clause allows for
intrasession appointments.85 The Court also placed weight on the fact that,
when including military appointments, Presidents have made thousands of
intrasession recess appointments.86
The Court also looked at the Senate’s historical actions regarding the
Clause. It found that to the extent that the Senate or a committee had expressed
a view, the view “favored a functional definition of ‘recess,’” which includes
intrasession recesses.87 The Court asserted that the Senate had not fought back
against presidential uses of recess appointments during intrasession breaks for
at least seventy-five years.88
After providing its initial rationale as to its holding, the Court then set
about attempting to refute three important arguments to the contrary. First, the
Court tackled the assertion that the Framers intended the Clause to apply only
to intersession breaks because they were hardly aware of intrasession
recesses.89 Instead of intending the Clause to apply only to the type of recess
they knew, the Founders, the Court claimed, knew that they were writing a
document that was designed to apply to changing times.90 Taking a living
constitutionalist view, the majority held that the Framers likely intended the

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 2561.
Id.
Id. at 2559, 2561.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560.
Id. at 2562.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2563.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2564.
Id. at 2564–65.
Id. at 2565.
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Clause to apply to new circumstances that correspond with the purpose of the
Clause and are consistent with its language.91
The second argument the Court’s majority sought to refute was the
assertion that the intrasession interpretation allows “the President to make
‘illogic[ally]’ long recess appointments” due to the portion of the Clause
allowing a recess appointee to serve until the end of the next Senate session.92
The Court claimed that this provision of the Clause allows the President and
the Senate to always have at least one full session with which to undertake a
complete confirmation process.93
Finally, the Court tackled the argument that its intrasession interpretation
of the Clause would render the Clause vague. The Court responded, however,
that vagueness was unavoidable and was arguably present no matter which
interpretation one accepted.94
After concluding that “recess” included intrasession breaks, in arguably a
move of raw judicial power, the Court placed a floor on how long the Senate
must not be in session in order to qualify as “the Recess of the Senate” under
the Clause. Instead of looking to the three-day provision in the Adjournment
Clause, the Court again looked to historical practice and indicated that it had
not found even one example of a recess appointment made during an
intrasession break shorter than ten days.95 Therefore, the Court held:
[A] recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is presumptively too short
to fall within the Clause. We add the word “presumptively” to leave open the
possibility that some very unusual circumstance—a national catastrophe, for
instance, that renders the Senate unavailable but calls for an urgent response—
could demand the exercise of the recess-appointment power during a shorter
96
break.

As previously indicated, the Court also decided the issues of when a
vacancy must come into being in order for it to be filled by a recess
appointment and whether pro forma sessions of the Senate constitute actual
sessions sufficient to prevent the Senate from going into recess. In regards to
the former issue, the Court found the text ambiguous and, again, relying on
historical practice, concluded that the Clause includes vacancies coming into
existence while the Senate is in session.97 In deciding the latter issue, the Court
deferred to the Senate’s determination of whether a pro forma session qualifies

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2565.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2566–67.
96. Id. at 2567. “Political opposition in the Senate would not qualify as an unusual
circumstance.” Id.
97. Id. at 2573.
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as an actual Senate session. The Court refused to determine whether Senators
were present on the floor of the chamber during particular pro forma sessions,
finding that “[j]udicial efforts to engage in these kinds of inquiries would risk
undue judicial interference with the functioning of the Legislative Branch.”98
Since pro forma sessions qualify as actual sessions of the Senate and
because the Senate had been convening pro forma every three days, at the time
the President made the recess appointments at issue, the Senate was in the
middle of only a three-day recess.99 Therefore, under the new ten-day standard
established by the Court, three days was not enough to trigger the President’s
recess appointment power, and the individuals in question were not validly
appointed.100
C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
In response to Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, Justice Scalia penned a
concurrence that reads more like a dissent. Scalia agreed only with the
judgment of the Court and took great issue with its rationale. Scalia would find
that “the Recess” includes only breaks occurring between separate formal
sessions of the Senate.101
Justice Scalia began his concurrence by pointing out the importance of the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers. He argued that the
Constitution’s structural provisions are just as important as the Bill of Rights in
protecting individual rights.102 Justice Scalia asserted the Court, therefore, has
an important duty to preserve the structural separation established by the
Constitution and that it should not “defer to the other branches’ resolution of
such controversies,” nor acquiesce in an encroachment by one branch upon the
other simply because the encroached-upon branch approves.103
Justice Scalia’s analysis began with an examination of the plain meaning
of the text of the Clause. He noted that the Clause uses “recess” in
contradistinction with “session.”104 Since neither the Administration nor the
majority opinion argued that “session” has colloquial meaning, it is taken that
it means a formal session.105 Therefore, “the Recess” must refer to the break
between formal sessions, i.e., an intersession recess.106 Further, Justice Scalia

98. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2576.
99. Id. at 2573–74.
100. Id. at 2574.
101. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also would have held that vacancies
that “may happen during the Recess of the Senate” refers only to vacancies that come into being
during an intersession recess. Id.
102. Id.
103. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 2595.
105. Id. at 2596.
106. Id.
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noted the Clause’s use of the word “recess” as opposed to the word “adjourn”
and asserted that the provisions of the Constitution using “adjourn” referred to
intrasession breaks.107 Since the Framers used a different term in the Clause,
they, therefore, must not have been referring to intrasession breaks.108
Justice Scalia argued that through its rationale, the majority was attempting
to ensure a “prominent role for the recess-appointment power in an era when
its influence is far more pernicious than beneficial.”109 He asserted that the
need for the Clause no longer existed, and that its use now is mainly relegated
to allowing the President to circumvent the Senate’s advice and consent
function.110
A significant amount of Justice Scalia’s concurrence was also spent
refuting the majority’s reliance upon historical practice. Justice Scalia
acknowledged that a widespread and unchallenged practice occurring from the
early days of the Republic should guide the Court’s interpretation of a
constitutional provision that is ambiguous.111 However, “past practice does not,
by itself, create power.”112 Regardless, Justice Scalia argued the history does
not support the interpretation set forth by the majority.
Upon meticulously going through the relevant history, Justice Scalia
concluded that roughly ninety percent of intrasession recess appointments were
made since 1945.113 Further, he pointed out that the first attorney general
opinion on the matter, by Attorney General Philander Knox, expressly
indicated that the President could make recess appointments only during
intersession breaks of the Senate, and it was not until 1921 before a
presidential legal adviser would embrace the majority’s interpretation of “the
Recess.”114 Justice Scalia also noted that the increased number of intrasession
recess appointments in the twentieth century elicited bi-partisan criticism from
numerous senators, including amicus curiae briefs filed in recent cases from
Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Senator Mitch McConnell.115 Justice Scalia
summed-up the meaning of this history quite succinctly:
Intrasession recess appointments were virtually unheard of for the first 130
years of the Republic, were deemed unconstitutional by the first Attorney
General to address them, were not openly defended by the Executive until

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
2600.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2596 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2598.
Id.
Id. at 2594. Justice Scalia argued that the text was not ambiguous in the first place. Id. at
Id. at 2594.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2604 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2602–03.
Id. at 2604–05.
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1921, were not made in significant numbers until after World War II, and have
116
been repeatedly criticized as unconstitutional by Senators of both parties.

III. ANALYSIS
In analyzing the Supreme Court’s opinion, Professor Michael Rappaport’s
three possible interpretations of “the Recess” are helpful.117 These three
interpretations are: the intersession interpretation—where a recess appointment
can only be made during the recess between two congressional sessions; the all
intrasession recess (or all-recesses) interpretation—where “recess” includes all
intrasession recesses irrespective of length; and the practical intrasession
interpretation—where appointments may be made during intrasession recesses
that are greater than a certain set length.118
The opinions by the D.C. Circuit and Justice Scalia in the Noel Canning
case and by the Third and Fourth Circuits in New Vista and Enterprise
Leasing, all interpreted the Clause as having the intersession-only meaning. On
the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Stephens took the all-recesses
view, and Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court applied the
practical interpretation. This Note sets out to demonstrate that those opinions
taking the intersession-only view of the Clause have the proper interpretation.
It does so by analyzing the text of the Clause, examining how the Clause fits
within the Constitution’s structure of separation of powers, evaluating the
relevant executive practice, and finally demonstrating the issues with the
Supreme Court’s practical interpretation.
A.

Text

When interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the proper place to
begin is “with its text.”119 An examination of the Clause, within the context of
both the time of its writing and the Constitution as a whole, demonstrates “the
Recess” to have the intersession-only meaning.
Before demonstrating the ways in which the Constitution’s text evidences
that the Recess Appointments Clause holds the intersession-only meaning, it is
first important to show the ways in which it does not so demonstrate, such as
arguments regarding the definite article “the.” The D.C. Circuit, in its opinion
in Noel Canning, placed great emphasis on the fact that the Recess
Appointments Clause uses the definite article “the” in “the Recess” as opposed

116. Id. at 2605.
117. Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1547 (2005).
118. Id.
119. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 221 (citing City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)).
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to “a” or “an.” This argument resembles one made by Michael Carrier.120
Carrier argued that the use of the definite article “the” in the phrase “the
Recess” as opposed to the indefinite article “a” indicates that the Clause is
referring to the single intersession recess.121 He asserted that the use of “the”
indicates “the singular form of Recess,” while “the use of [an] indefinite
article . . . would not limit as explicitly the meaning of Recess to the
intersession recess.”122 The argument is problematic, however, and is
ultimately weakened when examined against other uses of the definite article
“the” in similar contexts in the Constitution. For example, Article I, Section 3,
Clause 5 discusses “the Absence of the Vice President” regarding the Senate’s
choosing of a President pro tempore.123 Though the clause says “the Absence,”
it does not make sense to suggest that it refers to “one absence per session or
year.”124 Therefore, it is not wise to rely upon the use of the definite article
“the” to determine whether “the Recess” includes intrasession breaks.
Other textual and historical evidence, however, demonstrates that the
Recess Appointments Clause refers only to intersession recesses. For instance,
though Professor Rappaport, in his seminal article on the Clause, noted that the
1828 edition of the Webster’s Dictionary defines “recess” as a “‘[r]emission or
suspension of business or procedure,’” and noted that this definition could
conform with the “all-recesses” interpretation, he argued that “recess” also has
a more specialized meaning that is ultimately consistent with the intersession
interpretation.125 He pointed to the power under English law known as
“prorogation” that allowed a king to end a session for both houses of the
English Parliament.126 In adapting English parliamentary practice to the new
Congress, the Framers did away with monarchical prorogations, and, instead,
gave the right to end sessions to the Houses of Congress.127 The Framers used
the term “adjourn” to describe this power, and in a departure from English law,
the use of “adjourn” in the Constitution describes both intersession and
intrasession breaks.128

120. Michael A. Carrier, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2204 (1994).
121. Id. at 2219.
122. Id.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. The full clause reads: “The Senate shall chuse their other
Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall
exercise the Office of the President of the United States.” Id.
124. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1561 n.225.
125. Id. at 1550 & n.191.
126. Id. at 1550–51.
127. Id. at 1551 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4).
128. Id. at 1551 n.198.
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The words of a constitutional provision should be read in the context of the
entire text,129 and an intratextual130 analysis of the five clauses, which use the
term “adjournment” compared to the use of “recess” in the Recess
Appointments Clause, demonstrates the words to have the all-recesses and
intersession-only meanings, respectfully. Professor Rappaport demonstrated
that these constitutional provisions using “adjournment” “exhibit[] a pattern,”
indicating that the “all-recesses” meaning is implicated when “adjournment” is
used.131 He found that “adjournment” or “adjourn” in the Presentment
Clause,132 Three-Day Adjournment Clause,133 Presidential Adjournment
Clause,134 and the Orders Presentment Clause135 referred to the equivalent of
both intersession and intrasession recesses.136 He also found that “adjourn” in
the Day-to-Day Adjournment Clause137 refers to “extremely short intrasession
recesses,” but could also possibly refer to an intersession recess.138 Therefore,
the fact that the Recess Appointments Clause uses “recess” instead of
“adjourn” is important because the use of differing terms within a legal text
suggests differing meanings for those terms.139 Since the “all-recesses”

129. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406 (1819) (asserting that, in constitutional
interpretation, “a fair construction of the whole instrument” must be given); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1532 (1998) (book review) (noting
the “truism that interpreting a text requires context”).
130. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (“In
deploying [intratextualism], the interpreter tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears in
the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very
similar) word or phrase.”).
131. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1557–59.
132. The relevant portion of the clause states: “If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same
shall be a Law in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
133. “Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall
be sitting.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §5, cl. 4.
134. The relevant portion states that, “in case of Disagreement between [the two Houses],
with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, [the President] may adjourn them to such Time as he
shall think proper.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
135. The relevant portion provides: “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question
of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7,
cl. 3.
136. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1558–59.
137. The relevant part of the clause states: “[A] Majority of each [House of Congress] shall
constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
138. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1559.
139. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 170 (2012) (explaining the cannon of the “Presumption of Consistent Usage”: “[a] word or
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meaning is included in the Constitution’s use of “adjournment,” then “recess”
must have either the intersession or the practical meaning.140 However, “the
closer the practical interpretation is to the all-recesses interpretation, the less
support the pattern provides to the practical interpretation.”141 In other words,
under the practical interpretation, the fewer the minimum number of days (or
amount of time) that the Senate would be required to be in an intrasession
break in order for it to be in a “recess,” the “less reason for the Framers to have
gone to the trouble of distinguishing between recesses and adjournments.”142
This fact, therefore, suggests that the intersession interpretation, and not the
“all-recesses” or a practical interpretation, like the one adopted by the Supreme
Court, is the more logical interpretation of “recess.”143
B.

The Clause and the Structure of Separation of Powers

As Justice Scalia has argued repeatedly, the Constitution’s scheme of
separation of powers is just as important, if not more important, than the Bill of
Rights in protecting individual liberty.144 The presidential appointments
method is an important part of the separation of powers scheme and plays an
important role in protecting the liberties of the people. The General
Appointments Clause states that the President:
[S]hall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
145
established by Law.

phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms
suggests a variation in meaning.” (emphasis added)).
140. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1559–61.
141. Id. at 1561.
142. Id.
143. Id. Rappaport further backs up his assessment by pointing to the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire Constitution of 1792, both of which used “recess”
to refer to an intersession break. Id. at 1552.
144. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710–11 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In making this argument,
Justice Scalia frequently notes that to the Framers, “the Bill of Rights was an afterthought,” and
that the structure of government is the best protector of liberty, asserting that “every tin-horn
dictator in the world today has a bill of rights.” See, e.g., The National Press Club, The Kalb
Report–Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Antonin Scalia, YOUTUBE (Apr. 17, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=z0utJAu_iG4.
145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The same provision also allows Congress to “vest the
Appointment . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
Id. In regard to Noel Canning, in passing the National Labor Relations Act, Congress did not vest
the appointment of members of the NLRB in the President alone or in any other body. 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(a) (2012).
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As explained by Alexander Hamilton, there are two main benefits of the
Senate’s check on executive appointments: (1) The check leads to better
individuals serving in the Executive Branch; and (2) it allows for more
transparency in the process of selecting appointments and, therefore, more
accountability. In The Federalist No. 76, Hamilton explained how Senate
confirmation of executive appointments provides an incentive for the President
to take care in appointing executive officials. He stated that Senate
confirmation “would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the
President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity.”146 Hamilton argued that the
“possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing.”147
Essentially, Hamilton argued that the fact that presidential appointments must
pass Senate muster requires the President to be more thoughtful about his
appointments. With the Senate scrutinizing nominees, appointments are more
likely to be based on skill and merit as opposed to merely being the result of
personal or political favors or familial relations. The scheme, therefore, leads
to better nominees and better individuals working in the Executive Branch,
and, in turn, a better-functioning government.
In The Federalist No. 77, Hamilton also suggested that the requirement of
Senate confirmation for executive appointments brings the process into the
open and allows for more accountability. He argued that Senate confirmation
allows for public scrutiny of the nominee and requires the Executive to set
forth his rationale for appointing the individual.148 If the appointment were left
to the Executive, or to a council of appointments within the Executive Branch,
it would be unknown to the public whether the Executive was appointing the
person because of his merit:
Or whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of persons, whose
chief merit is their implicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a
149
despicable and dangerous system of personal influence . . . .

These questions, under such a scheme, would “be the subjects of
speculation and conjecture” among the public.150 Additionally, Hamilton
argued that the Constitution’s appointments process allows for proper
accountability. If a nomination is rejected because the nominee is unqualified
or is an otherwise bad nomination, the blame falls squarely on the President.151

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 2003).
Id. at 464.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467.
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Likewise, if the Senate rejects a good nominee, it takes the blame.152 Finally, if
the President nominates and the Senate confirms a bad appointment, both
would, as Hamilton put it, “participate . . . in the opprobrium and disgrace.”153
In order to examine the role of the Recess Appointments Clause within this
scheme, and what it suggests as the proper interpretation of “the Recess,” it is
instructive to again look to Hamilton and his early analysis of the Clause in
The Federalist No. 67. In writing The Federalist No. 67, Hamilton was not
discussing what the Clause means by “the Recess;” rather, his purpose was to
refute the notion that the Recess Appointments Clause allowed the President to
make appointments to vacant Senate seats during a Senate “recess.”154 The
essay is important, however, due to the structural analysis Hamilton set forth.
Hamilton gave several reasons why the Clause does not give the President
the power to make appointments to vacant Senate seats. He attached
importance to the relationship between the Recess Appointments and the
General Appointments Clauses.155 Hamilton said that the recess appointment
power is “nothing more than a supplement to the other.”156 Further, Hamilton
asserted that the Recess Appointments Clause was intended “for the purpose of
establishing an auxiliary method of appointment in cases, to which the general
method was inadequate.”157 Hamilton continued, writing that:
The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate
jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate;
but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in
session for the appointment of officers; and as vacancies might happen in their
recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay,
the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, singly,
158
to make temporary appointments . . . .

In concluding his argument, Hamilton claimed that since the recess
appointment power is a “supplement,” and is “auxiliary” to the general
appointment power, then the scope of offices that the President can fill with a
recess appointment is limited to the offices that the General Appointments
Clause allows, and that clause does not allow for the filling of Senate

152. Id.
153. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 148, at 467.
154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 411–12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 2003).
155. Id. The General Appointments Clause states that the President “shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 154, at 411.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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vacancies.159 Though Hamilton did not provide an explanation of what
constitutes a “recess” for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, The
Federalist No. 67 provides an excellent structural analysis of the Clause.
Having examined the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause within
separation of powers as understood by the Founders, this purpose can be used
to determine the meaning of the Clause. The Clause’s “auxiliary” nature drives
the analysis. It does not make sense to extend the “auxiliary” method of
appointment to an intrasession break and allow any vacancy to be filled during
this time regardless of when the vacancy arose. Such an extension, as the D.C.
Circuit found, could enable the “auxiliary” method of recess appointments to
“swallow the ‘general’ route of advice and consent.”160
Under the Supreme Court’s holding, however, the President is given an
extraordinary amount of appointment power if he can make intrasession recess
appointments to vacancies that come into being at any time regardless of
whether the Senate is in session.161 Under this interpretation, if the President
cannot get an appointment approved by the Senate, he need only wait until the
Senate goes into one of its many intrasession breaks and then make a recess
appointment. Such a situation occurred when President George W. Bush
appointed John Bolton to the position of United States Ambassador to the
United Nations. President Bush formally nominated Bolton, but when the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to send the nomination to the
floor for a full up or down vote, the President waited until Congress took an
intrasession break and then appointed Bolton.162 This use of the Recess
Appointments Clause to circumvent the advice and consent function of the
Senate does not conform with a power that is “auxiliary” in nature. The recess
appointment power should be invoked “in cases to which the general
method . . . [is] inadequate.”163 The general method is not failing in instances
where the Senate is blocking an executive appointment. It is of course perfectly
within the Senate’s purview to block presidential appointments. When the
Senate does so, it is refusing to give its consent to the presidential appointment

159. Id. Hamilton further pointed out that, at that time, the Constitution required the state
legislatures to make appointments to vacancies in the Senate, and that if a state legislature was in
recess when a vacancy arose in the national Senate, then a temporary appointment was to be made
by the state executive. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 superseded by U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 2 superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
160. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
161. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1489–90.
162. Helene Cooper, Bolton to Leave Post as U.S. Envoy to United Nations, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/05boltoncnd.html; Elwood, supra
note 29.
163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 154, at 411.
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as is allowed by the Constitution in its scheme of checks and balances.164 If the
advice and consent requirement is to act as a real check upon the Executive,
then it makes no sense for the President to be allowed to make intrasession
recess appointments assuming he is not constrained by the time at which the
vacancy was created.
Finally, the context of the time in which the Constitution was adopted also
demonstrates its “auxiliary” role. Since its inception, Congress has traditionally
held one legislative session per year, with an intersession recess between the
end of one session and the beginning of the next session the subsequent
year.165 In the early days of the Republic, Congress held one legislative session
lasting anywhere from three to six months, and then would adjourn into an
intersession recess that would last from six to nine months.166 If an important
pressing appointment needed to be made, due to the slow nature of
transportation in those days, it could take a long time for Senators to
reassemble to Washington, D.C. from their respective states. The long travel
time, as well as the fact that most members of Congress had other jobs and
duties to attend to in their home states, would have made it impractical to keep
the Senate in constant session year-round. Therefore, the solution to this
problem, as Hamilton indicated, is the scheme established by the Recess
Appointments Clause: when the Senate is in recess, the President can make
temporary appointments to posts that are otherwise subject to Senate approval.
Justice Joseph Story supports Hamilton’s analysis. In his Commentaries on
the Constitution, Justice Story says, in regards to the power given the President
under the Clause:
The propriety of this grant is so obvious, that it can require no elucidation.
There was but one of two courses to be adopted; either, that the senate should
be perpetually in session, in order to provide for the appointment of officers;
or, that the president should be authorized to make temporary appointments
during the recess, which should expire, when the senate should have had an
opportunity to act on the subject. The former course would have been at once
burthensome to the senate, and expensive to the public. The latter combines
167
convenience, promptitude of action, and general security.

Therefore, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the Recess
Appointments Clause is largely an anachronism.168 It is a relic of the horse and
buggy era and serves little use in the modern era of electronic communication

164. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing that the President shall make
appointments “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”) (emphasis added).
165. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1500.
166. Id. at 1500–01.
167. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1551 (1833), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_2_2-3s58.html.
168. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2598 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and air travel. Though it should not be written out of the Constitution,169 the
text of the Clause should not be given a meaning it cannot naturally bear,170
especially if such a reading is simply for the sake of keeping the Clause
relevant. Even if one subscribes to the living constitutionalist interpretation of
the Clause taken by the majority, what is the point of giving new meaning to a
clause where “its only remaining use is the ignoble one of enabling the
President to circumvent the Senate’s role in the appointment process”?171
C. Executive Practice
In issuing its ruling, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon executive
practice. It is clear, however, that the practice of intrasession recesses is neither
as longstanding nor as worthy of judicial deference as indicated by the Court.
Presidents utilized the recess appointment power infrequently in the early
days of the Republic, and the recess appointments that were made were
intersession appointments.172 Prior to the Civil War, intrasession recesses of
Congress were rare.173 The first intrasession recess appointments came in 1867
under President Andrew Johnson.174 From the Civil War until World War I,
President Calvin Coolidge made the only other intrasession recess
appointments.175 However, Theodore Roosevelt caused controversy in 1903
when, as President, he made appointments to vacancies during what Roosevelt
termed a “constructive recess.”176 On December 7 of that year, the Senate
ended a special session and then immediately convened into a regular
session.177 Roosevelt argued “that a split second separated the two sessions,”
which created a recess that enabled him to make recess appointments.178 The
Senate Judiciary Committee subsequently issued a report rejecting Roosevelt’s
assertion that a recess had occurred,179 but took no other retaliatory action.180
In the modern era, Congress began taking more intrasession recesses, a
pattern which produced more intrasession recess appointments by
Presidents.181 This trend began in 1947 with President Harry S. Truman who

169.
170.
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Carrier, supra note 120, at 2209–11 (1994); Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1572.
Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1501.
Id. at 1572; OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 6.
Carrier, supra note 120, at 2212.
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Carrier, supra note 120, at 2212.
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made twenty such appointments over four intrasession recesses.182 President
Dwight Eisenhower made nine intrasession appointments; however, neither
Presidents John F. Kennedy nor Lyndon Johnson made any.183 President
Richard Nixon made eight intrasession appointments; President Gerald Ford
made zero; and President Jimmy Carter made seventeen intrasession recess
appointments.184 Presidents began using intrasession recess appointments in
much greater number beginning with President Ronald Reagan. Reagan vastly
increased the number of intrasession recess appointments compared to his
predecessors by making roughly seventy intrasession appointments.185 Many of
Reagan’s appointments were made in order to ensure the appointment of
controversial nominees by avoiding the Senate’s advice and consent role.186
President George H.W. Bush, though not wielding his recess appointment
power as controversially as Reagan, made thirty-seven intrasession recess
appointments.187 President Bill Clinton made fifty-three intrasession recess
appointments;188 President George W. Bush made 141;189 and President
Obama had made twenty-six intrasession recess appointments as of June 3,
2013.190
Likely in response to the large number of recess appointments made by
President George W. Bush, in 2007 the Democratic Senate began utilizing
short pro forma sessions during intrasession Senate breaks.191 Prior to that
time, no president had made an intrasession recess appointment during a
Senate break lasting less than ten days.192 Therefore, the idea was to use the
pro forma sessions to divide long Senate breaks into breaks of only three or
four days in an attempt to prevent the President from issuing recess

182. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2212–13.
183. Id. at 2213.
184. Id.
185. Carrier says that Reagan made seventy-three intrasession recess appointments, while the
Congressional Research Service states the number is seventy-two. Id. at 2214; Memorandum,
Cong. Research Serv., The Noel Canning Decision and Recess Appointments Made from 1981–
2013, at 4 (Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter CRS Noel Canning Memo], available at http://democrats.ed
workforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/documents/112/pdf/Recess%
20Appointments%201981-2013.pdf.
186. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2214–15.
187. Id. at 2215.
188. CRS Noel Canning Memo, supra note 185.
189. HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33310, RECESS
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, JANUARY 20, 2001–OCTOBER 31, 2008,
at 3 (2008) [hereinafter CRS REPORT ON BUSH RECESS APPOINTMENTS].
190. HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42329, RECESS
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 5 (2013).
191. Alex N. Kron, Note, The Constitutional Validity of Pro Forma Recess Appointments: A
Bright-Line Test Using a Substance-over-Form Approach, 98 IOWA L. REV. 397, 405 (2012).
192. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 15 n.97.
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appointments; or, if an appointment was still made, at least make it the subject
of “significant controversy.”193 Such pro forma sessions, typically, are very
short—sometimes lasting only seconds— and require the presence of only one
or two Senators.194 Unlike President Obama who has argued that the pro forma
sessions do not limit his recess appointment power, President Bush did not
attempt to make any recess appointments while the Senate utilized pro forma
sessions.195 The Senate did not use pro forma sessions during President
Obama’s first year in office, but began the practice again in 2010 and
continued using such sessions through January 2012.196 At that time, the
President went against the Senate and refused to acknowledge the pro forma
sessions’ restraint on his recess appointment power.197
The Supreme Court also looked to opinions of the Executive Branch over
the years; however, the Executive has not been consistent in what it has viewed
as constituting a “recess” under the Recess Appointments Clause. Early
executive interpretations of the Clause found that the recess appointment
power extended only to intersession recesses.198 For example, in 1901,
Attorney General Philander Knox issued an opinion to President Theodore
Roosevelt advising him against making an intrasession recess appointment.199
Knox asserted that any temporary break within a regular session of the Senate
was not a recess referred to by the Recess Appointments Clause.200 He argued
that this prohibition against intrasession appointments extended even to long
intrasession breaks, and that no discernible line could be derived from the
Constitution sufficient to demonstrate how long an intrasession break must be
in order for an appointment to be made.201
The intersession-only view changed in 1921 with Attorney General Harry
Daugherty, however. Daugherty took a practical view of what constitutes a
Senate recess,202 and concluded that “the President is necessarily vested with a

193. Kron, supra note 191.
194. OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 2. Alex Kron described a pro forma session during
George W. Bush’s Presidency:
(1) Senator Jim Webb called the Senate to order; (2) the legislative clerk read a letter from
Senator Robert Byrd, the President Pro Tempore, appointing Senator Webb as Acting
President Pro Tempore for the session; and (3) Senator Webb announced that the Senate
would adjourn on recess until the next pro forma session.
Kron, supra note 191, at 406.
195. Kron, supra note 191, at 406.
196. Id. at 406–07.
197. Id. at 407.
198. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2233.
199. Id. at 2234.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Executive Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 21–22 (1921)
[hereinafter Daugherty Opinion].
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large, although not unlimited, discretion to determine when there is a real and
genuine recess making it impossible for him to receive the advice and consent
of the Senate.”203 Daugherty took the position that the recess appointment
power extended to intrasession recesses; however, the power did not extend to
short breaks.204 In fact, he maintained that even an adjournment for up to ten
days would not “constitute the recess intended by the Constitution.”205 In
Daugherty’s view no single bright line determined when the Senate is in
recess.206 Rather, he adopted a standard from a Senate Judiciary Report: “Is the
adjournment of such duration that the members of the Senate owe no duty of
attendance? Is its chamber empty? Is the Senate absent so that it can not
receive communications from the President or participate as a body in making
appointments?”207 It is this standard which the Administration pointed to in
support of its position in Noel Canning.
Since the Executive’s adoption of the intrasession view of “the Recess,”
the minimum number of days it has recognized for a Senate break to constitute
a “recess” has grown smaller and smaller. In 1960, Acting Attorney General
Lawrence Walsh208 found that a thirty-six-day break was sufficient;209
however, in 1992, the Office of Legal Counsel suggested that an eighteen-day
break was sufficient.210 President George W. Bush made recess appointments
during intrasession breaks lasting as few as ten days.211 In January 2012, in
accordance with President Obama’s controversial recess appointments, the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a memo recognizing the ability of the
President to make recess appointments during intrasession breaks of the Senate
lasting twenty days.212 However, the OLC also argued that pro forma sessions
of the Senate do not qualify as actual Senate sessions that interrupt an extended
Senate break.213 Therefore, the OLC found, the President could “conclude that
the Senate is unavailable for the overall duration of the recess” even while the
Senate is holding pro forma sessions.214

203. Id. at 25.
204. Id. at 24–25.
205. Id. at 25.
206. Id.
207. Daugherty Opinion, supra note 202, at 25.
208. William Rogers was the United States Attorney General in 1960; however, the recess
appointments opinion was signed under Lawrence Walsh as Acting Attorney General. William
Pierce Rogers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/rogers-william-pierce (last
visited Apr. 24, 2015); Recess Appointments, 41 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 480 (1960).
209. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2236.
210. Id. at 2238.
211. CRS REPORT ON BUSH RECESS APPOINTMENTS, supra note 189, at 7.
212. OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 9.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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Though the OLC expressly asserted that the President may make recess
appointments during a twenty-day intrasession Senate break, the practical
implications of the memo, if adopted, would arguably allow the President to
make appointments during a Senate break of any length. If the Executive is
permitted to choose what sessions of the Senate it finds sufficient to constitute
actual sessions that prevent the Senate from going into a “recess,” then
ultimately the Executive is determining unilaterally when the Senate is in a
“recess.”215 Arguably, the President could then recognize short adjournments
such as lunch and weekend breaks.216
In sum, the practice of intrasession recess appointments, though first used
in the nineteenth century, developed into consistent use more recently, and
only the last few Presidents have used the practice with any regularity. This
history shows that the traditional view by the Executive on what constitutes a
“Recess of the Senate” has been “all over the place.”217
History demonstrates that intrasession recesses were very rare in the early
years of the Republic,218 and, therefore, early presidents would not have had
many opportunities to test the constitutional waters and make intrasession
recess appointments. On the other hand, the argument can be made that the
lack of intrasession breaks in the first place suggests the Recess Appointments
Clause was never understood to apply to such breaks. Therefore, the argument
regarding early tradition is inconclusive at best.
Regardless, the use of intrasession recess appointments is a recent practice.
As Justice Scalia noted, of all intrasession recess appointments made, ninety
percent were made since 1945. Even then, intrasession recess appointments
arguably were not consistently made until under President Reagan.219
Therefore, the practice is not a longstanding “systematic, unbroken, executive
practice . . . [that] may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power,’”220 and, thus
entitled to great deference. Rather, given the implications of the Clause’s text
and structure, the nature of such recent presidential practices is not sufficient to
discard the intersession interpretation.
Further, the Executive has a self-interest in securing as broad a recess
appointment power as possible. Therefore, the opinions of executive advisors
and the historical practice should certainly be given less weight than the textual

215. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
216. Id.
217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (No. 12-1115).
218. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2209–11; Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1572.
219. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2214.
220. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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and structural aspects of the Clause, which suggest the clause holds the
intersession-only meaning.
D. The Practical Interpretation
The Supreme Court ultimately adopted a practical interpretation of “the
Recess,” holding a Senate break of less than three days was not long enough to
trigger the Clause, and a break shorter than ten days was presumptively too
short. In so holding, the Court examined two possible standards, which
included Attorney General Daugherty’s standard and the three-day standard
derived from the Adjournment Clause. The former standard is unworkable,
while the latter is without a basis in the Constitution.
In Noel Canning, the Board asked the court to adopt the standard set forth
by Attorney General Daugherty in determining whether the Senate was in
recess. Under this standard, the Senate is in recess when it adjourns such that
(1) Senators “owe no duty of attendance”; (2) the chamber is empty; and (3)
the Senate cannot “receive communications from the President or participate as
a body in making appointments.” The court, however, rejected this test.
When the D.C. Circuit examined the test, it found that the vagueness of the
Daugherty standard “counsel[ed] against” its adoption,221 and that courts “must
‘establish high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague
distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch
conflict.’”222
The Daugherty standard is so vague that, as Professor Rappaport pointed
out, the features used to determine whether the Senate is in recess, in reality,
“do not operate to clarify when there is a recess.”223 The standard operates
under the assumption that when the Senate takes a recess, it completely shuts
down.224 This assumption is wrong, even when the Senate takes a long
break.225 During a recess, the Senate may hold committee meetings, which
thereby create a duty of attendance for certain Senators.226 Not only can Senate
committees meet during a recess, but since such a break does not affect the
committees’ powers, they can also begin the confirmation process of
presidential nominees during a recess.227 Further, during a Senate break, the
Senate can also leave personnel who are available to receive communications
from the President.228 In previous years, the Secretary of the Senate has been
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given the authority to receive presidential messages, including nominations for
appointments, during a recess.229 Therefore, the Court was correct to reject the
Daugherty standard in Noel Canning, since the features it describes cannot be
adequately ascribed to a Senate recess.
The Court, however, looked to the Adjournment Clause in holding that any
Senate break less than three days is without question too short to constitute a
“recess.” The Court was mistaken to do so, however, since the two clauses
serve different functions and, therefore, operate differently.
The Adjournment Clause prevents one house from unilaterally taking a
sustained break, which could prevent the passage of important legislation while
Congress is in session.230 Therefore, the three-day provision, as part of the
Adjournment Clause, makes sense: it allows one house to take a short break
from business, while preventing that house from using the break to unilaterally
hold up legislation. The Recess Appointments Clause, on the other hand, is an
“auxiliary” method of appointment to be used when the Senate cannot fulfill its
advice and consent role. Therefore, the two clauses have different purposes and
appear to have little relation to one another.
An examination of the practical implications of applying the three-day
adjournment provision to the Recess Appointments Clause demonstrates
further the unrelated nature of the two clauses. Under the three-day
adjournment definition of “the Recess,” the President could make a recess
appointment during any Senate break lasting longer than three days; however,
this makes little practical sense. A floor of three days hardly seems a sufficient
amount of time to warrant allowing the President to use the auxiliary method
of appointment.231 Under this definition of “recess,” a break lasting three days
and one minute would be sufficient for the President to exercise his recess
appointment authority, and it seems unlikely that a situation would arise
whereby a vacant position would need to be filled within such a short amount
of time. This argument is likely one of the reasons the Court held that a break
less than ten days, and not just three, was presumptively too short, barring
some extenuating circumstances. This ten-day standard was based on executive
practice and the fact that no prior President had made an intrasession
appointment over an intrasession break of less than ten days. However, as
previously discussed, a great deal of weight should not be placed on executive
practice in this area, not only because it is recent, but also because the
Executive has been “all over the place” in what it has traditionally viewed as
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constituting a recess.232 Therefore, the Court would have no consistent
executive view from which it could derive a standard.233
Finally, the Court gives little guidance as to what constitutes an
extenuating circumstance sufficient to overcome the ten-day presumption.
Even if such a circumstance were to arise, whatever it may be, there are, in the
event of most vacancies, laws and regulations in-place, which allow for
temporary acting appointments for certain positions to essentially fill the
vacancy.234 When a position becomes vacant for which Congress has provided
an acting appointment, typically, a subordinate to that position fills the position
in an acting capacity and assumes the position’s duties.235 Therefore, not only
do the differing contexts of the two clauses suggest that they do not inform one
another, but also, Congress has already acted to insure, in many instances, that
the duties of vacant positions will still be carried out until an appointment is
made.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the title of this Note should have a question mark added to the end.
There is no doubt that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Noel Canning significantly
narrowed the presidential recess appointment power; however, when the
Supreme Court issued its subsequent ruling, it took the scope of that power
back to where it existed before the disputed appointments. Rather than truly
narrowing the power, the Court found the furthest extent of the scope
previously reached by a President, and told the Executive from there, “you
shall not pass.”236 Nonetheless, Presidents had been pushing the envelope over
the years as they began making recess appointments during smaller and smaller
intrasession breaks, and it was only a matter of time before a President went
too far, only to suffer some kind of rebuke.237

232. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 217.
233. The Executive also has a vested interest in a standard consisting of a small number of
days. The shorter the length of a Senate recess in which the President can make an appointment,
the greater the President’s recess appointment power will be. However, the smaller the number,
the less the standard fits with the text and purpose of the Clause. Rappaport, supra note 117, at
1545.
234. Id. at 1514.
235. Id.
236. MOVIECLIPS, You Shall Not Pass – The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring
(7/8) Movie CLIP (2001) HD, YOUTUBE (May 26, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
VlaiBeLrntQ.
237. See John Yoo, Op-Ed., Diminishing the Presidency, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2013, 6:59
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323375204578271681410646810 (arguing
that by claiming “the right to judge the legitimacy of the other branches’ proceedings” by refusing
to acknowledge pro forma sessions, President Obama went too far and suffered a rebuke resulting
in the loss of his intrasession recess appointment power).
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Only time will truly tell whether the Court’s ruling severely hampers the
use of recess appointments to circumvent the Senate’s advice and consent
function. It could be that the holding regarding pro forma sessions will allow
the Senate to maintain an effective check on presidential appointments. The
Constitution establishes a government of co-equal branches, and the legislative
advice and consent function serves as a major check upon the Executive. This
check is part of a structural scheme implemented by the Framers to protect the
liberties of Americans. Though the Court may not have provided the best
interpretation, the Noel Canning decision is important in that it prevents the
President from effectively negating this check altogether. Such would have
been the effect of the Administration’s standard, thereby expanding the power
of the Executive at the expense of the Legislature.
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